Abstract. Some areas of biological research use artificial means to explore the natural world. But how the natural and artificial are related across wide-ranging research areas is not always clear. Relations differ further for bioengineering fields. We propose a taxonomy which would serve to elucidate distinct relations; there are three ways in which the natural is linked to the artificial, corresponding with distinct methods of investigation: i) a comparative approach (natural vs artificial) in which artificial systems are treated in the same way as natural systems, ii) a modeling approach (natural via artificial) in which we use artificial systems to learn about features of natural ones, and iii) an engineering approach (natural pro artificial) in which natural systems are used to draw inspiration for artefacts. Ambiguities about and between these approaches limit the development of fields and impact negatively on interdisciplinary communication.
Introduction
Distinction between two kinds of synthetic approaches to biology -i) comparative, such as ALife or Evolutionary Robotics and ii) the more widely known (and understood) modeling practice -are not entirely new. These approaches have previously been separated on the basis of: clarity or complexity [1] ; methodology (Miller 1995 cited in [2] , [3] [4] [5] ; abstractness [6] ; and as different levels of enquiry [7] [8] . There are implicit arguments about the relationship between natural and artificial underlying each of these distinctions but these considerations are not seen as important. For example, in [5] Harvey et al. argue that Evolutionary Robotics (ER) 'is a new scientific tool', insofar as the methodological emphases (minimal cognition, existence proofs and reduction of bias) are very different from modeling. They claim that ER 'systems will not tell us how real cognitive systems work' whereas, for example, neuroscientific models might [5] . It is clear that the artificial system in modeling stands in for the natural system -because results about the model tell us how natural systems work. Yet it is not always clear how the ER system relates to a natural system. This is evidenced for example in the discussion of an ER simulation study into the origins of learning (Tuci et al. [9] cited in [5] ). In this experiment some mechanisms for learning emerged, although no hypothesis could be made for these kinds of processes or the architecture that would support them -otherwise it could not be a study into the origins of learning itself. The learning mechanisms cannot be evidence for a natural system because the methodological processes have not specified a target system for this purpose, as modeling a learning mechanism would do [5] . What this ER experiment did show is that while an organism can evolve processes which enable it to learn, the actual mechanisms that emerged can only be used to help build concepts about learning. The relationship between natural and artificial in such work is not explicit; this has resulted in a negative view of simulation approaches. For example, Webb argues in [7] that because theoretical proofs eventually require comparison to the natural world they are basically a class of model, and if they don't represent anything "real" in the natural world they are (or should be) irrelevant to biological investigation. The issue for simulation work, if Webb's argument is accepted, is that it would be evaluated against the same requirements as modeling -justifying work on the basis of a concrete fit to empirical data [1], [7] . As we have just shown it is not empirical data that is generated but ideas about what mechanisms might be, and proof that learning can evolve from simple mechanical components. The outcome forced by Webb would not enable ALife researchers to develop scientific practices or revise relevant biological concepts (see [4] for an example), both of which are important for the advancement of this newer field. Furthermore, given the possibility that life might be artificially created, we would need a structure for the analysis of this artificial system because the artificial would have the same characteristic as a natural system, making it distinct from the representative characteristic of a model. These two distinct relationships between the natural and artificial each give rise to their own epistemological concerns and considerations. One important concern is that the processes of simulation work in ways that go beyond (or abstract away from) our cognitive abilities. The argument that the non-anthropocentric process of simulation requires different epistemological considerations follows Humphreys (see [3] ). Humphreys has different arguments from the one we present here, but we do have similar conclusions -that a "new-analysis" of the relation between artificial and natural is necessary, and that this includes making their epistemological concerns distinct. Our paper provides a structure for this analysis to take place.
As well as aiding the development of newer fields we see our work as providing an important framework for interdisciplinary communication. In light of the ever-greater specialisation within science -and, conversely, the rise of collaboration -our taxonomy offers a new tool for assisting professional dialogue and public science engagement. It is in this spirit that we include clarification of how the developing fields of bioengineering relate to the epistemological approaches of comparison and modeling. Finally, following Cordeschi [10] our intention here is not to carve unnecessary boundaries between approaches and opposing paradigms (i.e. we think that both comparative and modeling work is important, and within them, work from different kinds of theoretical positions).
